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Introduction
The Supreme Court has rejected the view that a policy challenged as
racially discriminatory in violation of the equal protection clause is subject
to less stringent scrutiny if it is benign rather than invidious. According to
the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause, the same level of
heightened scrutiny applies to any racially discriminatory policy. As
Justice O'Connor explained in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,'
"Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for [racially
discriminatory] measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics."2
* Associate Professor, Stanford Law School. Thanks to Paul Brest, Jennifer Eberhardt,
George Fisher, Tom Grey, Spencer Overton, and Kathleen Sullivan for their feedback.
Special thanks to Ian Haney-Lopez and Kim Forde-Mazrui, whose comments prodded me
to sharpen the argument, and to Rachel Moran for timely criticisms. T.J. Berrings, Julie
Lipscomb, and Wendy Sheu provided research support.
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. Id. at 493. Throughout this essay, I use the term racially discriminatory
descriptively, to refer both to policies that are facially discriminatory in that they treat
individuals differently on the basis of race and to policies that are formally race-neutral
[573]
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In this essay, I draw upon the affirmative action controversy,
including the recent decisions regarding the policies of the University of
Michigan3 and its law school, 4 in order to highlight the persistence of the
benign-invidious asymmetry. Contrary to the pronouncements of the
Court, characterization of a policy as benign or invidious often influences
the level of scrutiny to which the policy will be subject.
To dramatize the continuing importance of the benign-invidious
asymmetry I consider two race-based college admissions policies.5 First, I
discuss what have been described as race-neutral alternatives to affirmative
action, admissions policies that take into account where applicants have
lived or attended high school or their socioeconomic status. Second, I
consider a historically black college's effort, hypothesized by Justice
Thomas in Grutter v. Bollinger, to create racial homogeneity in its student
body on the basis of empirical evidence documenting its educational
benefits.6
Although in neither case would a court explicitly invoke the benigninvidious asymmetry, in both cases a court's normative assessment of the
challenged policy as benign or invidious would influence the level of
scrutiny applied. A formally race-neutral policy enacted in order to boost
the enrollment of racial minority students would likely be exempt from
strict scrutiny because it would be viewed as benign, even as a policy
proven to have been enacted in order to increase the enrollment of white
students would be subject to strict scrutiny.7 Similarly, the Court would
apply to a homogeneity policy a more stringent form of strict scrutiny than
that applied to a diversity policy. Even a homogeneity policy whose
empirical justification and operation mirrored that of the diversity policy
upheld in Grutter would be struck down. The Court would view
homogeneity as more invidious than diversity.
While judgment regarding whether a policy is benign or invidious is
often reduced to which groups it burdens or benefits, that determination
may also turn on assessment of the values that a particular policy seems to
promote. While race-neutral policies would be viewed as benign because
they benefit, rather than burden, members of disadvantaged racial groups, a
but that are animated by a racial purpose.
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5. Although I focus in this brief essay on school admissions policies, the benign-

invidious asymmetry whose influence I analyze influences equal protection doctrine with
respect to race more generally.
6. 539 U.S. at 365-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. A court might also exempt a race-neutral policy from strict scrutiny by declining
to conclude that the policy was, in fact, motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.
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homogeneity policy that also benefits racial minorities would be viewed as
invidious because it seems to promote segregation, contrary to the
integrationist thrust of equal protection jurisprudence.
The persistence of the benign-invidious asymmetry suggests that the
moral intuitions it embodies are more widely shared than commonly
supposed. Even seemingly stalwart defenders of a symmetrical
nondiscrimination mandate may, in practice, support the very sort of
asymmetry they purport to oppose. Such deeply ingrained endorsement of
the asymmetry suggests both that it would be exceedingly difficult to
eliminate and, more importantly, that we should not strive to do so.
The discussion proceeds as follows: Part I briefly recounts the
Court's formal rejection of the benign-invidious asymmetry beginning with
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.i Part II considers race-neutral alternatives to affirmative action, and
Part III discusses the racial homogeneity policy hypothesized by Justice
Thomas in Grutter.

I. The Embrace of Symmetry
The symmetrical approach was relied on by Justice Powell in Bakke
9
and explicitly adopted by the Court in Croson and Adarand Constructors
Inc. v. Pena.'
In his lone opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Bakke,"
Powell rejected the view of four Justices that the affirmative action policy
of the University of California, Davis medical school should have been
subjected to only intermediate scrutiny because it benefited rather than
2
burdened members of disadvantaged racial minority groups. Powell

8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

In Croson, the

Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a contracting set aside provision enacted by the
city council of Richmond, Virginia.
10. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand, the Court held that strict scrutiny would apply

to a race-based contracting provision enacted by Congress.

11. Bakke invalidated the affirmative action policy of the University of California,

Davis medical school. 438 U.S. 265.
12. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). Nor did Justice

Powell share the view of the four Justices opposed to the University of California, Davis
policy that the case could be decided on statutory grounds without reaching the
constitutional issue. Id. at 408 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, J.J., and Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). These Justices would have found the Davis
program in violation of Title VI.
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forthrightly dismissed the contention that "discrimination against members
of the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized
as 'benign.' ' 13 Powell went on to state that it "is far too late to argue that
the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of
special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded
others. 14 Powell reasoned that "[i]f it is the individual who is entitled to
judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic
background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather
than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group,
then constitutional standards may be applied consistently."15
In Croson and Adarand the Court incorporated into equal protection
doctrine the symmetrical approach that Justice Powell advocated in Bakke.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor concluded in her opinion for the majority that
"the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent
on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." 6
The Court relied upon this same reasoning in Adarand and described it as
a principle of "consistency." 18
In applying strict scrutiny to the affirmative action policies of the
University of Michigan and its law school, the Gratz/Grutter Court
formally adhered to the symmetrical approach adopted in Croson and
Adarand. The Court reiterated its view, stated in Adarand,that "whenever
the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that
language and
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within' 1the
9
"
protection.
equal
of
guarantee
spirit of the Constitution's
II. Race-Neutral Alternatives
What have come to be known as race-neutral alternatives to
affirmative action have been enacted by public universities in California,2 °

13. Id. at 295.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 299. Justice Powell further stated, in often quoted language: "The
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the
same protection, then it is not equal." Id. at 289-90.
16. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
17. Adarand,515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
18. Id. at 224 (stating that "all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal
Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized."). Scholarly commentators have generally
been critical of the Adarand decision. See, e.g., Ian Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism:
JudicialConduct and a New Theory of RacialDiscrimination,109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30).
20. After Proposition 209 prohibited affirmative action programs in California
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Texas, 1 and Florida. While these new admissions schemes raise a number
of interesting policy questions,23 here I only consider whether they would
be subject to strict scrutiny if their constitutionality were challenged.
To begin with, such policies differ from conventional affirmative
action policies in that they do not employ a racially discriminatory means.
Race-neutral policies are not subject to strict scrutiny on the ground that
they treat individual applicants differently on the basis of race, as do
conventional affirmative action policies. Distinguishing among applicants
on the basis of socioeconomic background or where they live or attend high
school does not, of course, warrant heightened scrutiny, as such
considerations are not constitutionally suspect.
But race-neutral policies may warrant strict scrutiny if they are
animated by a racially discriminatory purpose. A quarter century ago in
Washington v. Davis,4 the Court defined discriminatory purpose as the
touchstone of an equal protection violation, a position it has never
disavowed.2 ' The Court's subsequent decisions in Village of Arlington
26
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
and
PersonnelAdministrator of Mass. v. Feeney27 reaffirmed, as the Arlington
Heights Court stated, that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or

university administrators implemented a plan to guarantee admission to the top students
at each high school in the state, introduced more subjective admissions criteria, and
experimented with class-based affirmative action.
See, e.g., Richard H. Sander,
Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J.LEG.EDUC. 472 (1997); Karen
W. Arenson, CaliforniaProposalAims to Improve College Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2000, at A16.
21. In Texas, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the state's affirmative action program.
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996). In its place, the state enacted the so-called "Ten
Percent Plan" to guarantee university admission to the top 10% of each high school
graduating class. See Peter Applebome, Affirmative Action Ban Changes a Law School,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1999, at A14.
22. In Florida, the state's voters simultaneously repealed affirmative action and
implemented a policy that guaranteed admission to a state university to the top twenty
percent of students in each high school in the state. See Reuters, Florida Ends Use of Race
in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2000, at A14.
23. I have considered some of these issues in R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values
and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029
(2001). (analyzing the various conceptions of merit that might animate college admissions
practices).
24. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
25. In Washington v. Davis, the Court reasoned that unconstitutional racial
discrimination requires a finding of discriminatory intent and straightforwardly declared
that "[a] purpose to discriminate must be present." Id. at 239 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)).
26. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
27. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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Clause." 28
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Even prior to the adoption of the discriminatory purpose standard, the
Court had invalidated formally race-neutral policies enacted in part to
29
disadvantage racial minorities.
Suppose that a university acknowledged using socioeconomic or
geographic admissions criteria as a proxy for race, in order to increase the
number of minority students at the university. Would such a formally raceneutral policy be subject to strict scrutiny? The Court's disavowal of the
benign-invidious asymmetry suggests that strict scrutiny should apply to
such policy every bit as much as to a formally race-neutral policy intended
to increase the enrollment of white students.30 There is ample reason to
conclude, however, that the Court would not apply strict scrutiny to raceneutral policies intended to benefit disadvantaged racial minorities.
The Supreme Court has not unequivocally stated that race-neutral
policies intended to benefit racial minorities are exempt from strict
scrutiny. Writing for the majority in Croson, Justice O'Connor faulted the
city of Richmond for having enacted a contracting set-aside for racial
minority firms without having considered "the use of race-neutral means to
increase minority business participation in city contracting."3 In Adarand,
the Court similarly looked to the defendant's consideration of the viability
tailoring test.3 2
of formally race-neutral policies as an element of the narrow
28. 429 U.S. at 265. The Feeney Court similarly observed that racial discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause "must be traced to an intent to discriminate on the
basis of race." 442 U.S. at 260 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-44 ). Feeney and Arlington
Heights also created uncertainty as to the precise meaning of discriminatory intent. The
Feeney Court, for example, seemed to equate discriminatory intent with malice. See 442
U.S. at 279.
29. For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Supreme Court
invalidated a redrawing of the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee that disenfranchised all
of the black residents. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the Court
overturned the enactment of grandfather clauses that conditioned the right to vote on
one's grandfather having been eligible to vote at the time immediately preceding the
passage of the 15th amendment. More recently, in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court invalidated race-neutral policies that were enacted in order to
maintain racially segregated schools. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating a "freedom of choice" plan).
30. It is worth noting that the opinions in Adarand and Croson arguably signal the
Court's unease with the implications of the coupling of the discriminatory purpose
standard and the consistency principle. In Adarand, for example, the Court cryptically
stated: "We note, incidentally, that this case concerns only classifications based explicitly
on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although
facially race-neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a
racially discriminatory purpose." Adarand,515 U.S. at 213.
31. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
32. In Adarand the Court faulted the lower court for "not address[ing] the question of

Fall 20031

BENIGN-INVIDIOUS ASYMMETRY

Numerous lower federal courts have followed suit. 33 These cases leave
open the question whether race-neutral alternatives are constitutional
because they satisfy strict scrutiny or because they are exempt from strict
scrutiny.
Yet lower federal courts have explicitly declined to apply strict
scrutiny to formally race-neutral state action arguably intended to benefit
members of disadvantaged racial minority groups. In Byers v. City of
Albuquerque,34 for example, the Tenth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny
to a police department's decision to lower the written test score required to
advance in the promotion process, even as the court accepted, for the sake
of argument, allegations that the cutoff score was lowered to increase the
number of non-whites and women eligible for promotion. 5 Similarly, in
Hayden v. County of Nassau," the Second Circuit did not apply strict
scrutiny to the decision to consider scores from some elements rather than
others of a police entrance exam in order to improve the total scores of
African-American candidates.37 In Raso v. Lago,38 the First Circuit declined
to apply strict scrutiny to the decision to curtail a group of displaced
residents' statutory preference for new housing. The statutory preference
of the predominantly white displaced residents was curtailed in order to
promote racially integrated housing by increasing the chance of nonwhites
to gain access to the new housing.39 Finally, in Allen v. Alabama State
Board. of Education,4° the Eleventh Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny to a
narrow tailoring in terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, for example, whether there
was 'any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business
participation' in government contracting." 515 U.S. at 237-38 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at
507).
33. See, e.g., Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't. of Transp., 345 F.3d 964 (2003);
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 983 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[a] 'raceconscious remedy will not be deemed narrowly tailored until less sweeping alternativesparticularly race-neutral ones-have been considered and tried," such as the use of Section
8 vouchers in public housing context) (quoting Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th
Cir. 1997)); Podbresky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that application
of strict scrutiny to race-based programs entails consideration of "possible race-neutral
alternatives"); Ensley Branch NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994); Peightal v.
Metro. Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994); Billish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d
1269 (7th Cir. 1992).
34. 150 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir.1998).
35. Id. at 1276.
36. 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1999).
37. Id. at 47.
38. 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998).
39. Id. at 16-17. The curtailment of the preference was prompted in part by a consent
decree previously entered into by HUD, which had helped to finance the project.
40. 164 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1999).
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consent decree that mandated that future teacher certification exams be
formulated to minimize the disparate impact on minority teacher
candidates.41
These cases suggest, but do not definitively establish, that a raceneutral effort to benefit disadvantaged racial minorities is exempt from
strict scrutiny. In each of these cases, courts declined to apply strict
scrutiny to state action that reallocated some opportunity among racial
groups. Such an effort to reallocate opportunity may be viewed as a raceneutral form of affirmative action. On the other hand, it is far from clear
that lowering a test score requirement, say, in order to increase the number
of minorities who qualify should be viewed as racially discriminatory.
Minimizing disparate impact may reallocate opportunity among groups not
as an end in itself, but as a necessary means of realizing the ultimate
purpose of avoiding legal liability or reducing the prospect of litigation. If
disparate impact doctrine embodies a permissible conception of equality,
then efforts to comply with its mandate should not be viewed as
discriminatory.
In other cases, as well, a court may not find proof of a racially
discriminatory purpose. A race-neutral admissions policy, for example,
need not have been enacted in order to boost the enrollment of racial
minorities. Such policies might simply reflect an institution's decision to
pursue socioeconomic or geographic diversity rather than racial diversity.
Moreover, even if a given policy was enacted primarily to increase the
enrollment of racial minority students, proof of that fact might be elusive.
The university would have obvious reasons to obscure its intent. Even
when confronted with substantial evidence of discriminatory purpose, a
court that wanted to uphold a challenged policy might be inclined to
conclude simply that the proof requirement had not been met. Doing so
would uphold the policy without seeming to contravene the symmetrical
nondiscrimination mandate of equal protection doctrine.
The broader consequences of applying strict scrutiny to race-neutral
policies intended to benefit racial minorities also suggest that courts will
exempt such policies from strict scrutiny. A truly symmetrical application
of strict scrutiny could imperil a multitude of policies intended, in part, to
benefit racial minorities. 42 Would a state's race-neutral effort to increase
41. Id. at 1353.
42. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral
Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331 (2000); Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative
Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039 (1998). As Professor Forde-Mazrui insightfully notes,
"taken to its logical end, the [consistency principle of the] Equal Protection Clause
presumptively forbids all governmental efforts to address the stark social and economic
disparities that persist between racial groups." 88 GEO. L.J. at 2334.
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voting participation among racial minorities, or to repeal its felon
disenfranchisement law precisely because of its effect on black men,
warrant strict scrutiny? What of an effort to decrease the incidence of HIV
infection among black women in particular? How about a school district's
effort to close the racial gap in academic achievement? The prospect of
applying strict scrutiny to these sorts of measures would cut against the
view, shared by many, that the government should be able to play some
role in narrowing racial disparities in, for example, political participation,
education, employment, and health.
Il. Racial Homogeneity
Justice Thomas concluded in his Grutter dissent that "[c]ontained
within today's majority opinion is the seed of a new constitutional
justification for a concept I thought long and rightly rejected-racial
segregation. 43 Justice Thomas posed the provocative hypothetical of a
historically black college that seeks racial homogeneity in its student body.
Justice Thomas worried that a historically black college's "rejection of
white applicants in order to maintain racial homogeneity [would be]
'4
permissible... under the majority's view of the equal protection clause."
Although Justice Thomas' stated concern that Grutter will lead to judicial
approval of racially segregated education is undoubtedly misplaced,
analyzing the constitutionality of his hypothetical homogeneity policy is
instructive.
A homogeneity policy might be premised on the same sort of
justification as the diversity policy upheld by the Court in Grutter.
Proponents of such a policy might pursue racial homogeneity not for its
own sake but because it yields educational benefits. More broadly, the
policy might reflect the view that students who share a similar cultural
orientation, for example, would be more likely to develop the type of trust
and personal comfort that facilitates intellectual interaction and exchange.
Just as the Michigan defendants offered social science evidence that

43. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also stated that
"[the Court's deference to the Law School's conclusion that its racial experimentation
leads to educational benefits will, if adhered to, have serious collateral consequences." Id.
at 364.
44. Id. at 365.
45. In fact, there is some reason to believe that in other contexts homogeneity may
yield benefits. See, e.g., Katherine Williams & Charles O'Reilly, Demography and
Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RESEARCH ORG.
BEHAV. 77 (1998) (concluding that in many organizations diversity is more likely to have
negative than positive effects on group performance).
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diversity enriches the educational experience, 6 so too would the proponents
of a homogeneity policy offer evidence that homogeneity promotes
students' learning outcomes. Such claims are not as outlandish as
48
universities' stated commitment to diversity would make them seem. For
example, there is evidence that black students seem to perform better
academically at historically black colleges than at majority white
institutions.49
A homogeneity policy might operate similarly to the law school policy
upheld in Grutter, and therefore would seem to satisfy the narrow tailoring
test. In its pursuit of homogeneity, the historically black college would not
categorically reject white applicants, place a ceiling on the number of white
students, or mechanically award bonus points on the basis of race. Instead,
consistent with the narrow tailoring test, admissions officers would use race
"in a flexible, nonmechanical way,"50 considering each applicant
holistically and comparing each applicant to all other applicants.
Admissions officers might, for example, evaluate each applicant's
knowledge of, and experience with, black history, politics, and culture.
46. The Court at the outset characterized the benefits of diversity as "substantial."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313
(1978)). The Court then approvingly referenced the District Court's findings that:
[T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps
to break down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons
of different races. These benefits are important and laudable because classroom
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting
when the students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.
Id. at 333 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 246a). The Court then goes on to note that
"[in addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous
studies show that student diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society and better prepares them as
professionals." Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
47. See Williams & O'Reilly, supra note 45.
48. Advocates for single sex schools have also made similar arguments. For a review
of this debate, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, PrivateNurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
PermissibleSex Discrimination,92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004).
49. See Frank Adams Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action
Can Save Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REV. 481, 496 (1996)
(reviewing studies that black students perform better at all black universities than at
predominantly white schools); see also FLEMING, BLACKS INCOLLEGE (1984); GURIN &
EPPs, BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS, IDENTITY AND ACHIEVEMENT: A STUDY OF STUDENTS

IN HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES (1975); Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success:
African-American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically
Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARV. ED. REV. 26, 29 (1992) (reporting
studies that find "in absolute terms, Black student intellectual gains are higher on Black
majority campuses than on White majority campuses. Research also reveals a poor match
between Black students' academic needs and White campus academic expectations").
50. Grutter,539 U.S. at 334.
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Race would, of course, enter into admissions officers' assessments of
applicants, but it would be no more than a plus factor, one characteristic
among many. Some white applicants would be admitted. In sum, as in the
Michigan cases, the school would pursue racial homogeneity neither
exclusively nor for its own sake, but instead as one aspect of a broader
commitment to a homogenous educational setting that yields educational
benefits.
Even if it satisfied the narrow tailoring test, such a policy would no
doubt be struck down. No matter its supposed educational benefits, a court
would readily find that racial homogeneity is not a compelling
governmental interest. That conclusion would be facilitated by, if not a
direct consequence of, a decision not to defer to the university's judgment
that racial homogeneity yields educational benefits. Because the decision
whether to defer determines the level of skepticism with which the court
evaluates the university's claims, that decision would heavily influence
whether the compelling interest test is met.
Recall that in the Michigan cases, the Court's acceptance of diversity
as a compelling interest turned partly on the Court's deference to the
University's judgment that diversity enriches the educational process. As
the Court stated in Grutter, "[t]he Law School's judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."'"
The Court noted that such "complex educational judgments [lie] primarily
within the expertise of the university. 52
Contrary to Justice Thomas' fear that a historically black college's
"assessment that racial homogeneity will yield educational benefits would
similarly be given deference,"53 the Supreme Court undoubtedly would
decline to defer to that view. The Court would not defer to that view, even
if held in good faith and supported by empirical evidence. Consequently,
the Court would decline to characterize racial homogeneity as a compelling
state interest.
The decision whether to defer not only determines whether the
compelling interest test will be met, it also reflects a normative evaluation
of the challenged policy as benign or invidious. How else could one
explain a decision to defer to university administrators' belief in the
educational importance of diversity but not to a logically parallel judgment
about the educational benefits of homogeneity?
The Court would be more inclined to defer to university support for
diversity than for homogeneity because the former fits more comfortably
51. Id. at 328.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

_v.
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with the integrationist and assimilationist thrust of equal protection
doctrine. While a diversity policy does presuppose that race is a significant
social identity, its goal is to break down racial stereotypes through
interracial interaction. A diversity policy connotes the primacy of
integration, whereas a homogeneity policy seems to confer value to
segregation.54 Indeed, a homogeneity policy appears to endorse the racial
segregation against which the civil rights movement fought. The
conclusion that diversity is compelling and homogeneity is not thus reveals
the influence of the same benign-invidious asymmetry that the Court has
formally disavowed.
Just as a decision not to apply strict scrutiny to a formally race-neutral
policy enacted to benefit racial minorities entails a judgment that the policy
is benign, so too does a decision to defer to the university reflect an implicit
assessment of the diversity policy as benign. The decision to defer to the
university's judgment that diversity yields educational benefits is no less an
expression of the benign-invidious asymmetry than a decision not to apply
strict scrutiny to a formally race-neutral policy animated by a racially
discriminatory purpose.
To be sure, the benign-invidious asymmetry is expressed differently in
the two settings - race-neutral policies on the one hand, and diversity or
homogeneity policies on the other. A race-neutral affirmative action policy
is exempt from strict scrutiny because its purpose is benign and it does not
rely on a racially discriminatory means. In other words, the policy is
formally neutral rather than facially racial. The homogeneity and diversity
policies, in contrast, are each subject to strict scrutiny because they rely on
a racially discriminatory means. Pursuant to each policy, individual
applicants would be evaluated in part on the basis of race. Such policies
are facially racial rather than formally neutral. The judgment of a
homogeneity policy as invidious and of a diversity policy as benign
determines not whether strict scrutiny applies, so much as the strictness of
the strict scrutiny that is applied. The diversity policy in Grutter was
subject to an especially relaxed form of strict scrutiny.

54. The homogeneity policy might also seem more invidious than a diversity policy
because its benefits are enjoyed by a racially homogenous group, rather than the
integrated group that a diversity policy would produce. While the diversity policy would
burden white applicants, it would benefit white students. The homogeneity policy, in
contrast, might seem to benefit only black applicants and students. It is worth noting, as
well, that societal attitudes about homogeneity and diversity are quite conflicted. While
the pursuit of a racially homogenous student body may seem invidious, a racially
homogenous college dorm or student group may seem benign or even a positive good.
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Conclusion
Courts' implicit reliance on the benign-invidious asymmetry may be at
odds with the formal dictates of equal protection doctrine, but it is certainly
consistent with widely shared, and sensible, moral intuitions about racial
discrimination. As a society, we are not as skeptical of discrimination
intended to benefit disadvantaged racial minorities as discrimination
intended to burden them. Nor do most people view discrimination that
promotes racial integration as morally equivalent to discrimination that
reinforces racial segregation.
Whatever the potential benefits of a symmetrical nondiscrimination
principle," it is so at odds with prevailing intuitions about racial
discrimination that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to actually enact
such an approach. The benign-invidious asymmetry seeps, almost
imperceptibly, into the views of even some of the most adamant proponents
of the symmetrical approach. Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in
United States v. Fordice,16 for example, relied on the very sort of
asymmetrical nondiscrimination principle that he explicitly and forcefully
disavowed in the Michigan cases.57
In Fordice, Justice Thomas
enthusiastically endorsed the "maintaining of historically black colleges, as
such."58 Of course, a government decision to aid colleges because they are
predominantly and historically black would, under a genuinely symmetrical
standard, be subject to strict scrutiny just as certainly as a decision to
support certain colleges because they are predominantly white. Not only is
his Fordice concurrence an ironic counterpoint to Justice Thomas' use of
the homogeneity policy to criticize the reasoning of the Grutter majority, it
dramatizes the extent to which the benign-invidious asymmetry is

55. A symmetrical prohibition of discrimination does seem to reflect the moral
primacy of nondiscrimination and to free the Court from the need to make contestable
value judgments. Moreover, some commentators believe that a symmetrical
nondiscrimination rule is easier for courts to implement and accords more with
widespread intuitions about the role and competence of the judiciary. As Justice Powell
reasoned in Bakke, "the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review
according to the perceived 'preferred' status of a particular racial or ethnic minority are
intractable." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
56. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
57. In Grutter, Justice Thomas equated compelling state interest with pressing public
necessity and "conclude[d] that only those measures a State must take to provide a
bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a 'pressing public
necessity."' 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Gratz,
Justice Thomas stated that "a State's use of racial discrimination in higher education
admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause." Gratz, 539 U.S. at
281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. 505 U.S. at 748 (emphasis in original).
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embraced even by those who most vehemently oppose it.
Widespread, if sometimes unacknowledged, support for the benigninvidious asymmetry suggests that we neither should, nor could,
completely banish it from the actual operation of equal protection doctrine.

